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I. INTRODUCTION 
The development of lakeshore property sparks intense debate 
in the Land of 10,000 Lakes.1  Stakeholders’ competing interests 
often clash: local governments try to increase tax revenue, property 
owners oppose development of neighboring properties to maintain 
property values and reduce lake traffic, and developers seek to 
maximize their return on investment by putting the property to its 
“highest and best use.”2
The land-use application approval process is extremely 
complex, and developers often need approval from the local 
government and other regulatory agencies.
   
3  For example, the 
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) oversees 
shoreland management and has established minimum standards 
for setbacks, dock management, invasive species growth, and lot 
sizes.4  To further complicate matters, if these applications are not 
approved within the statutory timeframe, they can be deemed 
approved by operation of law.5  As a result, many legal battles are 
fought over the development of lakeshore property, and there is 
never a shortage of media coverage to go around.6
Calm Waters, LLC v. Kanabec County Board of Commissioners is one 
recent example.
  
7  A Twin Cities metro-area developer, Calm 
Waters, LLC (“Calm Waters”), sought to subdivide lakeshore 
property in northern Kanabec County, Minnesota, in order to 
install an access road and build cabins on the individual lots.8
 
 1. See, e.g., Larry Oakes, Is There Such a Thing as a Landlocked Lakefront Lot?, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 31, 2008, at 1B (describing a controversial 
proposed development in Emily, Minnesota where homeowners would have access 
to the shoreline held in common ownership). 
  The 
 2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1681 (9th ed. 2009) (defining highest and best 
use as “the use that will generate the most profit”). 
 3. Carolyn W. Poulin, Comment, Land Use Applications Not Acted Upon Shall Be 
Deemed Approved: A Weighing of the Interests, 57 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 607, 609 
(1989). 
 4. MINN. R. 6120.2500–.3900 (2007).  Statutory authority for the Shoreland 
Management Rules is based on Minnesota Statutes section 103F.211, subdivision 1.  
The policy behind the Rules is “to preserve and enhance the quality of surface 
waters, conserve the economic and natural environmental values of shorelands, 
and provide for the wise use of water and related land resources of the state.”  
MINN. R. 6120.2600. 
 5. See infra Part II.D. 
 6. See Oakes, supra note 1. 
 7. 756 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2008). 
 8. Jay Corn, State’s Highest Court Rules in Favor of Kanabec County, KANABEC 
COUNTY TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, available at http://www.moraminn.com/ (search 
2
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county denied the application because Calm Waters planned to 
subdivide the land into approximately five-acre parcels, and this 
plan did not comply with the twenty-acre minimum lot size 
required by township and county ordinances.9  The developer 
argued, among other things, that the county had approved the 
application as a matter of law by failing to deny it within sixty days 
of submission.10
Reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court assumed 
without deciding
   
11 that county subdivision applications constitute 
“a written request relating to zoning” under the sixty-day rule.12  
The court then held that the county denied the subdivision 
application within the required timeframe.13  Therefore, it was 
unnecessary to specifically determine whether the sixty-day rule 
applied.14  In a concurring opinion, Justice Dietzen agreed with the 
disposition of the case but was very critical of the majority for 
failing to answer the “threshold issue” presented for review.15  He 
argued that the court should have determined applicability of the 
statute and then verified that the county had complied.16
This note examines the background of zoning and 
subdivisions, automatic approval statutes in other states, the details 
and history of the sixty-day rule, exclusions from the deadline, and 




“state’s highest court”; then follow “State’s Highest Court Rules in Favor of 
Kanabec County” hyperlink). 
  Next, it describes the facts of the 
Calm Waters case and the Minnesota Supreme Court decision, 
 9. Id.; see also KROSCHEL, MINN., TOWN ZONING ORDINANCE, § 4, subdiv. 5 
(2007), available at http://www.kanabeccounty.org/ (follow “Township 
Information” hyperlink; then follow “Kanabec Township Zoning Ordinance” 
hyperlink) (requiring “[a] lot area of not less than twenty (20) acres for each 
dwelling unit, of which an area of at least one (1) acre is determined to be 
buildable”).  The plan that Calm Waters submitted to the County averaged five 
acres per plot.  Corn, supra note 8. 
 10. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 719–20. 
 11. See generally BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 84 
(2d ed. 1995) (stating that “[t]he phrase ‘we assume, without deciding’ is a 
favorite of common-law courts”).  Assumptions are more hypothetical, as opposed 
to presumptions which are more inferential and authoritative and lead to 
decisions.  Id. 
 12. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 719; see MINN. STAT. § 15.99 (2008) (sixty-day 
rule). 
 13. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 722. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 723 (Dietzen, J., concurring). 
 16. See id. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
3
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including the concurring opinion.18  It then analyzes the decision, 
focusing on (1) the court’s refusal to reach the issue of whether the 
sixty-day rule applied to a subdivision application, (2) the policy 
that supports the court’s decision, and (3) the legislative history of 
the statute.19  Finally, this note concludes that the majority should 
have decided the issue and held that the sixty-day rule applied to 
subdivision applications made to a county, because they are 




Governmental entities seek compatibility between the interests 
of private property owners and the greater community.21 The 
implementation of land-use regulations such as zoning and 
subdivision regulations are two methods of accomplishing this 
goal.22
A. The History of Land Use Regulations 
 
Public regulation of land dates back to approximately 450 B.C. 
when the Romans adopted building regulations similar to modern 
setback requirements.23  During American colonial times, several 
colonies passed laws that banned noxious or offensive uses of 
property.24  The modern system of land-use regulation, as we know 
it, began in 1916 when New York City enacted the first 
comprehensive zoning code in the United States.25  The United 
States Department of Commerce published what is known as the 
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act in 1922, with the purpose of 
encouraging municipalities to adopt zoning ordinances.26
 
 18. See infra Part III. 
  Within a 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See infra Part V. 
 21. 12-79B POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79B.01[1] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 
2009). 
 22. Id. 
 23. MORTON GITELMAN ET AL., LAND USE 281 (6th ed. 2004). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 282; see also POWELL, supra note 21, § 79B.01[2]. 
 26. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 2 (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 
1926), reprinted in 5 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR. ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING 
AND PLANNING App. A (4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter STANDARD STATE ZONING 
ENABLING ACT]. 
4
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few years, 368 municipalities27 and 43 states had enacted zoning 
ordinances.28
Although adoption of zoning ordinances was widespread 
during this time, accusations began to mount that zoning was 
unconstitutional and represented a taking of property without just 
compensation.
 
29  In 1926, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of comprehensive zoning in the landmark case of 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty.30
The states, pursuant to their police powers, hold the ultimate 
authority to regulate land use through zoning.
   
31  States then 
delegate their police power to local governments through zoning 
enabling legislation.32  In Minnesota, the Municipal Planning Act33 
grants authority to municipalities34 and townships.  The Act 
authorizes cities to control land use by imposing four types of 
official controls: zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations, 
dedication requirements, and official maps.35  Minnesota counties 
have similar authority as municipalities under separate enabling 
legislation.36
Zoning ordinances are the most common form of land-use 
regulations.
   
37  Zoning ordinances divide land into districts, 
specifying the principal and accessory uses,38
 
 27. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 827 (6th ed. 2006). 
 which then regulate 
 28. GITELMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 282. 
 29. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 827. 
 30. 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding that zoning ordinances are a “valid exercise 
of authority” and for an ordinance to be declared unconstitutional it must be 
“clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare”).  Id.   
 31. Id. at 387.  “Police power” is defined as “the general governmental power 
to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the citizenry.”  PETER 
W. SALSICH, JR. AND TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE REGULATION 3 (2d ed. 2003). 
 32. See SALSICH & TRYNIECK, supra note 31, at 5–6. 
 33. MINN. STAT. §§ 462.351–.365 (2008).  Townships have the same land use 
authority as municipalities under the Municipal Planning Act, subject to the 
additional requirements of sections 366.10–.181.  In addition, townships may only 
be as restrictive or more restrictive than the county.  MINN. STAT. § 394.33 (2008). 
 34. See § 462.352 (defining municipality as “any city, including a city 
operating under a home rule charter, and any town”). 
 35. See §§ 462.351–.365. 
 36. See MINN. STAT. § 394.21, subdiv. 1 (2008) (authorizing counties with 
populations of less than 300,000 to carry on planning and zoning activities “[f]or 
the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the 
community”). 
 37. POWELL, supra note 21, at § 79B.01[1]. 
 38. See GITELMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 288. 
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the “construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of 
buildings, structures, or land” within those districts.39  Zoning laws 
also regulate nonconforming uses,40 variances,41 special use 
permits42 and rezoning requests.43  If the landowner seeks to use 
the property in a manner that does not comply with the zoning 
ordinance, the landowner must obtain an approved variance from 
the local board of appeals.44
In Minnesota, local governments, such as municipalities, use 
zoning ordinances to establish standards and procedures for 
regulating the use of land “[f]or the purpose of promoting the 
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.”
 
45  These zoning 
ordinances impose regulations such as minimum lot size, location 
of buildings on a lot, building size and number of stories, business 
or residential use, and population density.46
B. Subdivisions and Their Relationship to Zoning 
   
In many states, regulation of subdivisions evolved after zoning 
ordinances as a way to ensure that new developments had adequate 
infrastructure such as streets, sidewalks, and utility lines.47
 
  
Minnesota law defines a subdivision as: 
the separation of an area, parcel, or tract under single 
ownership into two or more parcels, tracts, lots, or long-
term leasehold interests where the creation of the 
leasehold interest necessitates the creation of streets, 
roads, or alleys, for residential, commercial, industrial, or 
 
 39. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 26, § 2. 
 40. See GITELMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 288 (defining nonconforming use as 
“[a] use of land that was in existence when a zoning restriction was adopted and 
that is prohibited by that restriction”). 
 41. Id. at 289 (“variances allow property owners to use their buildings and 
parcels for purposes otherwise prohibited by the zoning law”). 
 42. Id. (stating that special or conditional use permits obtained from the local 
administrative agency “authorize other uses to be made of the land” than those 
permitted in zoning districts). 
 43. Id. at 289–290 (explaining that owners can request rezoning when a 
proposed use is not permitted under current zoning law). 
 44. Id. at 290. 
 45. MINN. STAT. § 462.357, subdiv. 1 (2008); see also STANDARD STATE ZONING 
ENABLING ACT, supra note 26, § 1.  Most states have adopted this model statute in 
some form.  See GITELMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 282. 
 46. See § 462.357, subdiv. 1; see also STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, 
supra note 26, § 1 (describing various purposes of zoning ordinances). 
 47. POWELL, supra note 21, § 79B.01[3][b]. 
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other use or any combination thereof, except those 
separations: 
1)   where all the resulting parcels, tracts, lots, or 
interests will be 20 acres or larger in size and 500 
feet in width for residential uses and five acres or 
larger in size for commercial and industrial uses; 
2)   creating cemetery lots; 
3)   resulting from court orders, or the adjustment of a 
lot line by relocation of a common boundary.48
 
 
Subdivision regulations sometimes compel developers to 
dedicate a portion of the land for public facilities like parks and 
schools, or pay a fee in lieu of such a dedication.49  These are 
known as subdivision exactions,50 and they are commonly used by 
local governments.51
In Minnesota, subdivisions must be platted if they create “five 
or more lots or parcels of 2½ acres or less in size.”
 
52   A plat is 
defined as “one or more existing parcels of land drawn to scale . . . 
depicting the location and boundaries of lots, blocks, outlots, 
parks, and public ways.”53  While courts and practitioners often use 
the words “plat” and “subdivision” interchangeably, it is important 
to note that not all subdivisions are platted and not all plats are 
subdivisions.54
Both subdivision controls and zoning ordinances are means of 




 48. MINN. STAT. § 462.352, subdiv. 12 (2008).  
  
 49. 13-79D POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79D.03[1][c] (Michael Allan Wolf 
ed., 2009). 
 50. See id. § 79D.04[1][a]; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1560 (9th ed. 
2009) (defining subdivision exaction as “[a] charge that a community imposes on 
a subdivider as a condition for permitting recordation of the subdivision map and 
sale of the subdivided parcels.”). 
 51. See POWELL, supra note 49, § 79D.04[1][a]. 
 52. MINN. STAT. § 462.358, subdiv. 3a (2008).   
 53. MINN. STAT. § 505.01, subdiv. 3(f) (2008).  In addition, section 462.352, 
subdivision 13 of the Minnesota Statutes defines a plat as “the drawing or map of a 
subdivision prepared for filing of record pursuant to chapter 505 and containing 
all elements and requirements set forth in applicable local regulations adopted 
pursuant to section 462.358 and chapter 505.”   
 54. Gerald S. Duffy, The Land Subdivision Process, Minnesota Land Use: Current 
Issues in Subdivision, Annexation and Zoning Law, 2004 NAT’L BUS. INST. 5, available 
at WL 9888 NBI-CLE 1; see also POWELL, supra note 49, § 79D.03[4] (defining 
“subdivision”).   
 55. Marygold Shire Melli, Subdivision Control in Wisconsin, 1953 WIS. L. REV. 
7
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While subdivision regulations must be consistent with underlying 
zoning ordinances,56 the two controls are not mutually exclusive.57
Zoning restrictions regulate the type of development allowed 
on land, whereas subdivision controls regulate the way in which 
land is divided and developed.
   
58  In other words, zoning restrictions 
are focused on separating uses and regulating population density, 
whereas subdivision regulations are focused on ensuring that 
individual lots used as zoned will not impose any burden or 
expense on the community.59  Zoning regulations tend to remain 
static over a number of years, while subdivision regulations deal 
with ongoing development.60
In practice, the most important distinction between 
subdivisions and zoning is their administration.
  
61  Zoning is a 
legislative act, while subdivision regulations are entirely 
administrative.62
C. Subdivision Applications 
  
When a landowner decides to seek subdivision of a parcel of 
land, he must obtain the approval of a local planning commission 
or board.63  In Minnesota, subdivision applications are submitted to 




  It is very difficult to find precise data on the number of 
subdivision applications submitted for approval each year because 
there is no known organization that aggregates the information for 
 56. MINN. STAT. § 462.358, subdiv. 2a (2008).  
 57. ZIEGLER, JR. ET AL., supra note 26, § 89:4; see also Melli, supra note 55, at 389 
(stating that zoning and subdivision controls “are mutually dependent because the 
layout of an area is inseparable from the character of the use to be made of the 
land.”). 
 58. Melli, supra note 55, at 389. 
 59. ZIEGLER, JR. ET AL., supra note 26, § 89:4. 
 60. 12-P9 ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § P9.04[1] (Michael 
Allan Wolf ed., 2009). 
 61. Id. § P9.04[3][b]. 
 62. Id. (Changing a zoning ordinance involves “an amendment to a map that 
is adopted as part of a local ordinance or law” whereas subdivision regulation 
“simply involves comparing the proposed subdivision to standards set forth in 
adopted regulations.”).  
 63. See id. § P9.04[5][a]. 
 64. E-mail from Paul Merwin, Senior Land Use Attorney, League of 
Minnesota Cities, to Kelly F. Hudick, Student, William Mitchell College of Law 
(Aug. 28, 2009, 03:42 CDT) (on file with William Mitchell Law Review). 
8
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all three of the entity types.65
1. Approval Process 
 
The approval process is complicated, to say the least.  It is 
always a phased review, often in three stages: (1) a pre-application 
conference, (2) a preliminary plat approval, and (3) a final plat 
approval.66  Local subdivision regulations set forth the required 
documents for preliminary plat approval, and these typically 
include a drawing showing the lot boundaries, location of utilities, 
and open space.67
In Kanabec County, Minnesota, the subdivision ordinance 
requires the applicant to submit copies of the preliminary plan and 
protective covenants, topographic information, soils information 
and septic treatment, and a township approval letter.
   
68  The County 
recommends, but does not require, that the applicant have a 
discussion with the planning commission in order to “familiarize 
himself with this ordinance” and “avoid costly revision of plans and 
plats.”69
After the applicant submits the preliminary plat materials, staff 
members review the materials at various stages to ensure 




 65. See id.  The Metropolitan Council runs what is called a Plat Monitoring 
Program, which collects and reports data on residential development within the 
Twin Cities metro area.  See METROPOLITAN COUNCIL, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
COMMITTEE INFORMATION ITEM (May 19, 2008), available at http:// 
www2.metrocouncil.org/planning/assistance/PlatMonitoringReport2007.pdf.  To 
put some perspective on development volumes in any given year, in 2007 the 
council collected plat data from communities of Andover, Blaine, Brooklyn Park, 
Chanhassen, Cottage Grove, Eagan, Eden Prairie, Empire Township, Farmington, 
Hugo, Inver Grove Heights, Lakeville, Lino Lakes, Maple Grove, Medina, 
Minnetrista, Orono, Ramsey, Rogers, Rosemount, Savage, Shakopee, Victoria, 
Waconia, and Woodbury, and found that the number of approved plats was 83, 
the number of developable acres platted was 811.7, and the number of platted 
units totaled 3,028.  Id.  The breakdown of units was 1,464 single-family units and 
1,564 multi-family units, and the report states that this is “significantly fewer than 
platted in previous years.”  Id. 
  A public 
 66. POWELL, supra note 21, § 79D.03[5][c]. 
 67. See id. § 79D.03[5][c][i] (describing what a drawing would include). 
 68. See KANABEC COUNTY, MINN., ORDINANCES No. 4, art. III, § 3.11 (2006), 
available at http://www.kanabeccounty.org/ (follow “County Ordinances” 
hyperlink; then follow “#4, Plats & Subdivisions.pdf” hyperlink).  Section 3.17 
describes the data that is required in the preliminary plan.  Id. § 3.17. 
 69. See id. § 3.10. 
 70. POWELL, supra note 49, § 79D.03[5][b]–[d]. 
9
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hearing may also be required at this stage.71  If the planning 
commission approves the preliminary plat, the applicant can begin 
development and seek final plat approval.72  But if the commission 
denies the preliminary plat, the applicant can pursue an 
administrative or judicial appeal.73
2. Appealing a Denial 
 
Zoning enabling statutes must provide for appeal of the 
zoning enforcement officer’s decisions.74  Generally, a party has two 
stages of appeals: administrative and judicial.75  The first stage is an 
appeal to the board of adjustment, if one exists, and the second is 
directly to a state court.76
Landowners frequently seek a writ of mandamus,
 
77 which asks 
the court to compel the administrative body to approve the land-
use application.  A writ of mandamus is an “extraordinary legal 
remedy” and the district court will not issue such a writ unless the 
injured party shows that there is “no other adequate remedy.”78  In 
the alternative, a party may also file for a writ of certiorari directly 
to the appellate court, but that alternative is “more expensive, 
more time-consuming, and more complicated” than requesting a 
writ of mandamus.79
D. Automatic Approval of Land-Use Applications 
 
In many states, the process of approving or denying land-use 
applications falls within statutory time limits.80  Generally, these 
time limits are directive rather than mandatory.81
 
 71. Id. § 79D.03[5][c][ii]. 
  In some cases, if 
 72. Id. 
 73. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 74. SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 31, at 245. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1046–47 (9th ed. 2009) (defining mandamus as 
“[a] writ issued by a court to compel performance of a particular act by a lower 
court or a governmental officer or body, usually to correct a prior action or failure 
to act”). 
 78. Kramer v. Otter Tail County Bd. of Comm’rs, 647 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2002); see also Breza v. City of Minnetrista, 725 N.W.2d 106, 109–10 
(Minn. 2006). 
 79. Kramer, 647 N.W.2d at 26. 
 80. Poulin, supra note 3, at 610. 
 81. See Gregory G. Brooker & Karen R. Cole, Automatic Approval Statutes: 
Escape Hatches and Pitfalls, 29 URB. LAW. 439 (1997). 
10
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the planning commission does not approve or deny the application 
within a certain period of time, it is automatically approved.82
Automatic approval statutes are also referred to as “deemed 
approval statutes,” “streamlining statutes,” and “reverse pocket 
veto.”
   
83  An automatic approval is a serious consequence for a local 
governing body because it can unintentionally result in a negative 
effect on landowners or the community and also denies any 
opportunity to impose conditions on application approval.84
1. Automatic Approval in the Other Forty-nine States 
  
Because of the decisive consequence, both county officials and 
applicants are wise to closely monitor the calendar.   
Automatic approval statutes are quite common.  More than 
half of the states have an automatic approval statute for zoning, 
plat, or subdivision-related applications made to a government 
agency.85  While the general theme is automatic approval of the 
application if there is no action after a certain time period has 
expired, there are many variations among the statutes.86
The timeline for required agency action varies by state, but is 
generally between thirty and sixty days.
   
87
 
 82. Id. at 440. 
  The time at which the 
 83. Poulin, supra note 3, at 610. 
 84. Brooker & Cole, supra note 81, at 439. 
 85. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-52-32 (LexisNexis 2008); ALASKA STAT. § 29.40.110 
(2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-809 (West Supp. 2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-
412 (West 1998); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65956 (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 24-67-105.5 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-28-133.5 (West 2002); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-23-215 (West Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-
7d (West Supp. 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 1310 (Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12-752 (Supp. 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:113 (2002); MD. CODE ANN. art. 
66B, § 5.04 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 15 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. § 
15.99 (2008); MINN. STAT. § 462.358 (2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 89.420 (West 1998); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.350 (LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:27-6.7 
(West Supp. 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-20-7E (West 1978); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276 
(McKinney 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 711.05 (West Supp. 2009); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 711.09 (West Supp. 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 711.10 (West Supp. 
2009); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10709 (West 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-1150 
(Supp. 2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-2-24.1 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2259 
(2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 236.11 (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 18-5-307 (2009).  
This list is not exhaustive.  
 86. For more information on automatic approval statute variations and the 
policies behind them, see 2 JAMES A. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW AND GROWTH 
MANAGEMENT § 8:4 (May 2009); Poulin, supra note 3; Brooker & Cole, supra note 
81. 
 87. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-809 (2008) (thirty days); MO. REV. STAT. 
11
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clock starts is another variable.  In some states it starts when the 
application is submitted,88 while in others it starts only after a 
meeting of the agency or a public hearing.89  Many of the statutes 
have provisions for extending the timeline—some allow agencies to 
unilaterally extend the timeline, while others require the agency to 
obtain the consent of the applicant.90  Other states, such as Florida 
and Vermont, feel that automatic approval is an excessive result 
and have refused to enforce these statutes.91
2. Minnesota: The Sixty-day Rule 
 
In 1995, the Minnesota Legislature enacted Minnesota Statutes 
section 15.99, commonly referred to as the “sixty-day rule.”92  This 
automatic approval statute established a sixty-day deadline for 
governmental agencies to approve or deny a written request related 
to zoning.93  The purpose of the rule was straightforward: “to keep 
government agencies from taking too long in deciding issues like 
the one in question.”94  Although this procedural rule seems 
simple, the sixty-day rule is a heavily litigated issue in Minnesota 
land-use law.95
 
§ 89.420 (2009) (sixty days); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 18-5-307 (2009) (forty-five days).   
 
 88. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:113 (2009). 
 89. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-752(b) (2008) (stating that if the planning 
commission does not make a determination whether the plat conforms to 
subdivision regulations within sixty days after the first meeting, the plat shall be 
approved). 
 90. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 15.99, subdiv. 2(C) (2008) (stating that an agency must 
provide reasons in writing for the extension, but the applicant’s consent is not 
required); MO. REV STAT. § 89.420 (2009) (allowing commission to extend sixty-
day approval period with the applicant’s consent).  
 91. See Caliente P’ship v. Johnston, 604 So.2d 886, 887 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 
1992) (per curiam) (holding that “‘default approval’ is too harsh a sanction for 
noncompliance with the statute” where the agency was only two days late); see also 
In re Newton Enters., 708 A.2d 914, 918 (Vt. 1998) (refusing to apply automatic 
approval statute because it may result in approval of projects that are not designed 
to protect safety and welfare).   
 92. DEBORAH A. DYSON, HOUSE RESEARCH DEP’T, “60 DAY RULE” DEADLINE FOR 
CERTAIN AGENCY ACTIONS 1 ( 2008), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/ 
hrd/pubs/ss/ss60day.pdf. 
 93. MINN. STAT. § 15.99, subdiv. 2 (2006 & Supp. 2009).   
 94. Manco of Fairmont, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Rock Dell Twp., 583 N.W.2d 293, 
296 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).  In addition, “the  original 60-day time limit in 
subdivision 2 and the additional 60-day extension allowed under subdivision 3(f) 
serve as evidence of the legislature’s intent to require government to make 
decicions within 120 days of its initial consideration.”  Id.  
 95. See e.g., Hans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista, 728 N.W.2d 536 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss1/8
13. Hudick.doc 12/2/2009  4:50 PM 
336 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1 
Under the rule, if the agency fails to deny a request within sixty 
days, that request is approved as a matter of law.96  The statute 
defines an agency as “a department, agency, board, commission, or 
other group in the executive branch of state government; a 
statutory or home rule charter city, county, town, or school district; 
any metropolitan agency or regional entity; and any other political 
subdivision of the state.”97
The clock begins when the agency receives the written request 
containing all required information.
   
98  If the request is incomplete, 
the sixty days will start over only if the agency sends notice to the 
applicant of the missing information within fifteen business days.99  
In addition, the time limit can be extended before the expiration 
of the first sixty-day period if the agency provides written notice to 
the applicant, essentially allowing the agency a maximum of 120 
days to make a decision.100
The Minnesota Legislature has modified the statute five times 
since it was enacted: in 1996, 2003, 2006, and twice in 2007, with 
the most substantial changes in 2003.
 
101  The 2003 amendment 
added the definition of “request,” including within this definition 
“a written application related to zoning.”102
 
(Minn. 2007); Breza v. City of Minnetrista, 725 N.W.2d 106 (Minn. 2006); Am. 
Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309 (Minn. 2001); Advantage Capital 
Mgmt. v. City of Northfield, 664 N.W.2d 421 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Kramer v. 
Otter Tail County Bd. of Comm’rs, 647 N.W.2d 23 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); 
Demolition Landfill Servs., LLC v. City of Duluth, 609 N.W.2d 278 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2000). 
  An agency can reject 
 96. MINN. STAT. § 15.99, subdiv. 2(a) (2008). 
 97. Id. at subdiv. 1(b) (emphasis added). 
 98. Id. at subdiv. 3(a). 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at subdiv. 3(f). 
 101. The 1996 amendment was a small word change, adding “time limit in 
subdivision 2” to clarify the exact timeline that an agency can extend.  1996 Minn. 
Laws 24 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 15.99, subdiv. 3(f) (2008)).  The 2003 
amendment (among the other changes described in the text) defined applicant as 
“a person submitting a request under this section.”  2003 Minn. Laws 322 (current 
version at MINN. STAT. § 15.99, subdiv. 1(d) (2008)).  The 2006 amendment 
expanded the definition of request to include applications for “watershed district 
review, [and] soil and water conservation district review.”  2006 Minn. Laws 257 
(current version at MINN. STAT. § 15.99, subdiv. 1(c) (2008)).  The first 2007 
amendment specified that if an agency response included “an approval with 
conditions,” and those conditions were not met, then an agency decision to 
rescind approval would “not give rise to a claim that the 60-day limit was not met.”  
2007 Minn. Laws 340 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 15.99, subdiv. 3(c) (2008)). 
 102. 2003 Minn. Laws 322 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 15.99, subdiv. 1(c) 
(2008)).  
13
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an incomplete request that is missing required information, and if 
a request does not comply with the statutory definition it is deemed 
not to have been made.103
In addition, the 2003 amendment added clarifying 
information about denial, stating that if the agency denies a 
request, it must state the reasons for denial in writing at the time 
the denial is made and provide the written statement to the 
applicant.
   
104  It also added that the applicant, not just the agency, 
may extend the time limit by requesting it in writing.105
The exemption of the subdivision and plat review processes 
from the sixty-day deadline was the largest change resulting from 
the 2003 amendment.
 
106  The rule does not explicitly state that 
subdivision applications and plat reviews are exempt; instead, it 
enumerates specific laws that are excluded from the sixty-day 
deadline: section 462.358, subdivision 3b and chapter 505.107  In 
2007, the legislature added a third exclusion: section 473.175.108
a. Exclusions from the Sixty-day Rule 
  
Under the current sixty-day rule, issues arise regarding which 
exclusions should apply and how to interpret the statutes when 
read together.  
The first exclusion, section 462.358, subdivision 3b, addresses 
review procedures for subdivision applications submitted to a 
municipality.109  The statute sets a 120-day deadline for preliminary 
approval or denial of the subdivision application.110  If the 
municipality fails to approve or deny the application, it is deemed 
preliminarily approved.111
 
 103. See id.  
  The law was originally enacted in 1965, 
 104. Id. (current version at MINN. STAT. § 15.99, subdiv. 2(c) (2008)). 
 105. Id. at 323 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 15.99, subdiv. 3(g) (2008)).  
 106. See DYSON, supra note 92, at 1 (explaining that, among the 2003 
amendment’s modifications of the sixty-day rule, are exemptions for the 
subdivision regulation review process and the plat review process). 
 107. See 2003 Minn. Laws 322 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 15.99, subdiv. 
2(a) (2008)). 
 108. See 2007 Minn. Laws 724 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 15.99, subdiv. 
2(a) (2008)). 
 109. See MINN. STAT. § 462.358, subdiv. 3b (2008).  Section 462.352 defines 
“municipality” as “any city, including a city operating under a home rule charter, 
and any town.”  MINN. STAT. § 462.352, subdiv. 2 (2008). 
 110. MINN. STAT. § 462.358, subdiv. 3b (2008).   
 111. Id. 
14
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three decades before the sixty-day rule was enacted.112  The 
legislature’s purpose for the law was to provide municipalities with 
a “uniform procedure for adequately conducting and 
implementing municipal planning.”113
The second exclusion from the sixty-day rule is section 
473.175, which focuses on the review of comprehensive plans by 
the Metropolitan Council.
   
114  The Council is required to return a 
written statement to the local government unit that submitted the 
comprehensive plans within 120 days; otherwise the plans are 
deemed approved.115
The third exclusion is the plat review process in chapter 505.
 
116  
It requires that plats be approved by the city or town council, or if 
the land is outside the city limit, by the board of county 
commissioners.117  The statute sets forth requirements for review by 
the commissioner of transportation and county engineer and 
corresponding time deadlines, but provides no automatic approval 
provision.118  If the county engineer recommends changes to the 
plat that are not accepted by the city, representatives from both 
sides are required to meet.119  However, the statute explicitly states 
that this requirement does not extend the time deadlines in section 
15.99 and section 462.328 or prohibit final approval.120
Unless the application falls under one of the specific 
subdivision-related exceptions discussed above, a written request 
relating to zoning must be approved or denied within sixty days, 




 112. See 1965 Minn. Laws 1004 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 462.358, 
subdiv. 3b (2008)). 
 
 113. MINN. STAT. § 462.351 (2008).   
 114. See MINN. STAT. § 473.175 (2008).  The Metropolitan Council has 
jurisdiction over “the counties of Anoka; Carver; Dakota excluding the city of 
Northfield; Hennepin excluding the cities of Hanover and Rockford; Ramsey; 
Scott excluding the city of New Prague; and Washington.”  MINN. STAT. § 473.121, 
subdiv. 2 (2008). 
 115. See MINN. STAT. § 473.175, subdiv. 2 (2008). 
 116. See MINN. STAT. §§ 505.01–.03 (2008). 
 117. See MINN. STAT. § 505.03, subdiv. 1 (2008). 
 118. See id. at subdiv. 2(a)–(c). 
 119. See id. at subdiv. 2(c). 
 120. See id.  “This requirement shall not extend the time deadlines for 
preliminary or final approval as required under this section, section 15.99 or 
462.358, or any other law, nor shall this requirement prohibit final approval as 
required by this section.”  Id. 
 121. MINN. STAT. § 15.99, subdiv. 2(a) (2008). 
15
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b. Minnesota Case Law 
Although the court of appeals has decided many sixty-day-rule 
cases since the law was enacted,122 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
had only addressed the statute three times before the Calm Waters 
decision.123  In all three prior cases, the applications were made to a 
municipality rather than a county.124
In 2001, the supreme court decided American Tower, L.P. v. City 
of Grant.
   
125  The appellant sought approval to build a 
communications tower in the City of Grant, which required the 
company to obtain a conditional use permit.126  At that time, the 
city’s practice was to send out a notice with the application stating 
that it was prospectively granting an extension of the sixty-day 
deadline under section 15.99.127  The court held that, “an extension 
must be made after the application is received by the agency.”128  
The supreme court rejected the court of appeals’ holding that the 
extension was only allowed in extenuating circumstances, clarifying 
that the statute can be extended as long as the reasons are provided 
in a written notice.129
In 2006, the supreme court again addressed the sixty-day rule 
in Breza v. City of Minnetrista.
 
130  Appellant Breza bought property 
on Lake Minnetonka in the City of Minnetrista for the purpose of 
building a home.131  He filled approximately 5,737 square feet of 
wetlands on the property—an action that resulted in a cease and 
desist order from the Minnesota Department of Natural 
Resources.132  Breza applied for an exemption with the city, and the 
city denied the application approximately two years later.133
 
 122. See, e.g., Advantage Capital Mgmt. v. City of Northfield, 664 N.W.2d 421 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Demolition Landfill Servs., LLC v. City of Duluth, 609 
N.W.2d 278 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
  The 
 123. See Hans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista, 728 N.W.2d 536 
(Minn. 2007); Breza v. City of Minnetrista, 725 N.W.2d 106 (Minn. 2006); Am. 
Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309 (Minn. 2001). 
 124. Hans Hagen Homes, 728 N.W.2d at 538; Breza, 725 N.W.2d at 108; Am. 
Tower, 636 N.W.2d at 311. 
 125. 636 N.W.2d 309 (Minn. 2001). 
 126. Id. at 310. 
 127. Id. at 310–311. 
 128. Id. at 313 (emphasis added). 
 129. Id. at 314. 
 130. 725 N.W.2d 106 (Minn. 2006). 
 131. Id. at 108. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
16
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city agreed that it violated the sixty-day rule, but stated that the 
Wetland Conservation Act only allowed for a 400 square foot 
exemption.134  Breza was ordered to restore the balance of the 
wetlands, but sought a writ of mandamus instead.135
In its ruling, the supreme court held that section 15.99 cannot 
grant relief that exceeds the agency’s authority as allowed under 
state law.
   
136  The court also noted that the court of appeals has 
strictly enforced the sixty-day rule in a number of section 15.99 
cases, “consistently holding that an agency’s failure to comply with 
the section 15.99 timeline results in automatic approval of the 
request at issue.”137
In 2007, the supreme court decided a third sixty-day rule case, 
Hans Hagen Homes v. City of Minnetrista.
 
138  Hagen controlled land in 
the City of Minnetrista and submitted an application to re-zone 220 
acres and amend the comprehensive plan.139  The city denied 
Hagen’s application within the sixty-day deadline but did not 
provide written notice of the denial or reasons for the denial until 
after the sixty-day deadline had passed.140  The supreme court held 
that while a city is required to provide reasons for denial, failing to 
provide those reasons at the time of denial does not trigger 
automatic approval under section 15.99.141
There are also several appellate cases with significant holdings 
that shape the interpretation of section 15.99.  In Demolition Landfill 
Services, LLC v. City of Duluth,
   
142 the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
held that the sixty-day deadline provision of section 15.99 is 
“unambiguous and mandatory” and a failure to deny the 
application within sixty days constitutes an approval.143




 134. Id. at 109. 
 is 
particularly relevant to Calm Waters because it involved a 
 135. Id. at 109. 
 136. Id. at 114.  The court limited its holding, stating that it does not apply to 
issues “on which the city has discretion” such as “operation of city rules or 
ordinances that the city has the authority to modify.”  Id. at 114 n.15. 
 137. Id. at 113 (citation omitted).   
 138. 728 N.W.2d 536 (Minn. 2007). 
 139. Id. at 538. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 544 (“[S]ection 15.99 . . . only applies to the failure to timely deny 
the application.”). 
 142. 609 N.W.2d 278 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 143. Id. at 282. 
 144. 647 N.W.2d 23, 24 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
17
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preliminary plat application made to a county.  The court held that 
the sixty-day rule applied, and it then approved the application by 
operation of section 15.99 because the County had failed to 
approve or deny the application within sixty days.145
But in Advantage Capital Management v. City of Northfield, the 
court of appeals stated that section 15.99 was limited to zoning 
applications.
 
146  The court discussed the legislative history and 
pointed out that during floor debates, the senate deleted “land 
use” and replaced it with “zoning” in that version of the bill.147  The 
court held that the sixty-day rule applied to “a written request 
relating to zoning,” and this specifically means a zoning 
application.148  It reversed the district court for issuing a writ of 
mandamus for a building permit, because building permits are not 
zoning applications.149
III. THE CALM WATERS DECISION 
 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
Kroschel Township is a small, rural township located in 
Kanabec County, Minnesota, with a total area of just thirty-six 
square miles.150  In June 2006, Calm Waters, a real estate 
development company based in the Twin Cities, bought 
approximately 100 acres of land in Kroschel Township for 
$450,000.151  Michael Olsen, the owner of Calm Waters, intended to 
develop the land into cabins by subdividing the property into 
sixteen smaller lots and installing an access road.152
Calm Waters applied to Kanabec County (“the County”) for 
  The following 
timeline of events is critical to understanding the dispute. 
 
 145. Id. at 26. 
 146. 664 N.W.2d 421, 427 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 427–428. 
 150. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MINNESOTA: 2000 
POPULATION AND HOUSING UNIT COUNTS 18 (2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/
cen2000/phc-3-25.pdf. 
 151. Corn, supra note 8; see also, Kanabec County Assessor’s Office, Mora, MN, 
http://qpublic4.qpublic.net/cgi-bin/mn_kanabec_display.cgi?KEY=110025500& 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2009) (showing Calm Waters, LLC of Coon Rapids, MN as 
the owner of parcel number 110025500, which has a total acreage of 96.25). 
 152. Corn, supra note 8. 
18
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approval of its proposed subdivision on July 26, 2006.153  The 
County’s application form required an applicant to include a 
township approval letter.154  Because Calm Waters did not submit a 
township approval letter, the County returned the application as 
incomplete on August 8, 2006.155  Less than a week later, on August 
14, 2006, Calm Waters re-submitted an identical application, again 
without including a township approval letter.156
On September 7, 2006, the County published notice of the 
planning commission’s regular monthly meeting in the local 
paper.
 
157  Calm Waters objected to the meeting on the grounds that 
the County had not identified the meeting as a “statutorily-required 
hearing.”158  The County responded on September 18, 2006, by 
extending the time limit for decision on the application by an 
additional sixty days to comply with section 15.99.159  In addition, 
the County stated that it would provide official statutory notice of a 
public hearing for the October 2006 meeting.160
On September 27, 2006, Calm Waters petitioned the Kanabec 
 
 
 153. Calm Waters, LLC v. Kanabec County Bd. of Comm’rs, 756 N.W.2d 716, 
718 (Minn. 2008). 
 154. Id.   
 155. Id.  Calm Waters did not submit a township approval letter because it felt 
that “no letter was required by statute or by the Kanabec County Subdivision 
Platting Ordinance.”  Id.  The court agreed that no statute or ordinance required 
Calm Waters to submit a township approval.  See id. at 720.  The platting ordinance 
has since been modified to require a township approval letter.  See KANABEC 
COUNTY, MINN., ORDINANCE No. 4, art. 3, § 3.11.4, available at 
http://www.kanabeccounty.org/ (follow “County Ordinances” hyperlink; then 
follow “#4, Plats & Subdivisions.pdf” hyperlink) (requiring applicant to “submit to 
the Environmental Services Director . . . [t]ownship approval letter”). 
 156. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 720.  Calm Waters’ failure to submit the 
township approval letter seems to indicate that the company was unable or 
unwilling to obtain the letter.  See id.  The court noted that “[i]t appears from the 
record that the County may have treated the resubmitted application as though it 
were complete.”  Id. at 720. 
 157. Id. at 718. 
 158. Id.  Calm Waters objected by arguing that the notice was only that of a 
regular monthly meeting where the application would be considered as an agenda 
item, and because the county did not identify the meeting as a “statutorily 
required public hearing,” the County violated section 394.26.  Id.  “Notice of the 
time, place, and purpose of any public hearing shall be given by publication in a 
newspaper of general circulation . . . at least ten days before the hearing . . . .”  
MINN. STAT. § 394.26, subdiv. 2 (2008). 
 159. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 718. 
 160. Id. at 718.  The September meeting proceeded as planned with Calm 
Waters in attendance, but no action was taken on the application for the proposed 
subdivision.  Id.  The court also notes that during this hearing “several members of 
the public spoke out against the proposed subdivision.”  Id. 
19
Hudick: Property: Lost at Sea: Does the Sixty-day Rule Apply to County Su
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
13. Hudick.doc 12/2/2009  4:50 PM 
2009] CALM WATERS, LLC V. KANABEC COUNTY 343 
County District Court for a writ of mandamus, seeking to direct the 
County to approve the application, but the county denied the 
writ.161  On October 18, 2006, the County held the statutorily-
required hearing on the subdivision application.162  The County 
denied the application because it violated the ordinance requiring 
lots to be at least twenty acres.163
Calm Waters petitioned the Minnesota Court of Appeals to 
review both the district court’s denial of the writ of mandamus and 
the County’s denial of the proposed subdivision application.
  
164  In a 
consolidated decision, the court of appeals reversed the district 
court and granted the writ of mandamus in favor of Calm Waters.165  
The court of appeals held that the sixty-day rule applied to county 
subdivision applications, and the application was approved as a 
matter of law because the county did not approve Calm Waters’ 
preliminary plat application within the sixty-day deadline.166
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
   
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review of the case to 
settle two issues: first, whether the sixty-day rule applied to 
subdivisions, and second, whether the County complied with the 
sixty-day rule when it denied Calm Waters’ preliminary plat 
application.167  The court declined to address the first issue, 
holding that even if the sixty-day rule applied, the County did not 
violate it.168
In order to resolve the second issue, the court addressed each 





 161. Calm Waters, LLC v. Kanabec County Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 33–CV–06–
247, 2006 WL 6189404 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 17, 2006), rev’d, Nos. A06-2019 & A06-
2361, 2007 WL 3088590, (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2007). 
  First, the court addressed Calm Waters’ argument that 
 162. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 718. 
 163. Id. at 719.  See also supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 164. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 719.  Calm Waters appealed the denial to the 
County Board of Commissioners, but it “was not considered because the Platting 
Ordinance does not provide for such an appeal.”  Id. 
 165. Calm Waters, 2007 WL 3088590 at *1, rev’d, 756 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2008).   
 166. Id. at *4. 
 167. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 717. 
 168. The court stated, “Because we conclude that even if the 60-day rule 
applied, the County did not violate it, we decline to reach the question of whether 
section 15.99 applies to subdivisions.”  Id. at 718. 
 169. See id. at 719–22.  Construing section 15.99 subdivision 2(a) requires 
statutory interpretation, which the court reviewed de novo.  Id. (citing Hans 
20
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because the County lacked authority to require the township 
approval letter, the application was complete when first 
submitted.170  The court held that even though no local ordinance 
or state statute required a township approval letter, the County had 
the authority to require such a letter.171  Failure to provide the 
letter meant that Calm Waters never submitted a complete 
application.172  The sixty-day period started over on August 8, 2006 
when the County sent Calm Waters written notice that the 
application was incomplete.173
Second, Calm Waters argued that the County’s Environmental 
Services Director lacked the authority from the County to extend 
the sixty-day deadline, and therefore the extension was 
ineffective.
 
174  The court concluded that the letter extending the 
sixty-day deadline was the action of an agency under section 15.99, 
subdivision 3(f), and effectively extended the deadline for another 
sixty days.175
Finally, the court dismissed Calm Waters’ argument that the 
October 18th denial was invalid because the planning commission 
had authority to approve an application but not deny it.
   
176
 
Hagen Homes v. City of Minnetrista, 728 N.W.2d 536 (Minn. 2007)). 
  The 
court held that the County is authorized to delegate authority to 
 170. Id. at 720.  
 171. Id.  The court reasoned that “the County’s practice of providing 
subdivision applicants with a prepared application form, which includes the 
requirement that a township approval letter accompany the application, evinces a 
County policy in conformance with the Platting Ordinances and comprehensive 
plan requirements.”  Id.  The Platting Ordinance also states that land uses shall 
comply with township zoning ordinances.  Id.  Further, the county’s 
comprehensive plan specifies that the county seeks to maintain the “rural 
character and desire of the township.”  Id.  The Kanabec County ordinance has 
since been modified to require a township approval letter.  See KANABEC COUNTY, 
MINN., ORDINANCE No. 4, art. III, § 3.11, available at http://www
.kanabeccounty.org/vertical/Sites/{DF6C195B-A507-4144-A2C4-
98906E3F0669}/uploads/{2F811592-57AB-495B-BDBC-620EA778FA18}.PDF.  
 172. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 720.     
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 719. 
 175. Id. at 721.  The court stated that Calm Waters’ argument that the 
extension of the deadline was not the action of an agency as required by section 
15.99, subdivision 3(f) had no merit.  Id. (“Kanabec County is an agency under the 
plain language of subdivision 3(f). . . . Environmental Services is a department 
within Kanabec County.  Moreover, there is nothing in the record to suggest that 
the Environmental Services Director did not have the authority to act on behalf of 
that department.”). 
 176. Id. at 722.  
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the planning commission to deny subdivision applications under 
section 394.30, subdivision 5.177  The County effectively delegated 
that authority to the planning commission through the platting 
ordinance.178  The planning commission had the authority to deny 
because it would be anomalous for the Commission to have the 
authority to approve but not deny. 179
The court also briefly discussed the public policy reasons for 
holding that the planning commission had authority to deny 
applications.
 
180  Counties must have the ability to regulate 
competently and reliably, and holding that the planning 
commission does not have that authority would cause confusion 
and uncertainty.181  This is especially important in cases such as this 
where “the applicant deliberately seeks to subvert the clear County 
policy of cooperation with local townships’ zoning regulations.”182
Ultimately the court reversed the court of appeals, holding 
that the County timely denied Calm Waters’ application within the 
sixty-day time limit prescribed by section 15.99.
 
183
C. Concurring Opinion 
 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Dietzen184 agreed that the 
County complied with the sixty-day rule.185
 
 177. Id. 
  He wrote separately, 
 178. Id.  The ordinance specifically stated that the planning commission shall 
decide if an application conforms to the ordinance and county plans.  Id.  The 
court states that the lack of an appeal mechanism within the ordinance suggests 
that the planning commission had authority over final decisions.  Id. 
 179. Id.  “[I]n authorizing county boards to delegate approval authority to 
planning commissions, [section 394.30, subdivision 5] authorizes the delegation of 
denial authority . . . .”  Id.  If the planning commission did not have authority to 
deny, “its authority would be rendered meaningless.”  Id.  
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Justice Dietzen joined the Minnesota Supreme Court in 2008.  Minnesota 
Judicial Branch, Judge Profile: Associate Justice Christopher J. Dietzen, 
http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=JudgeBio_v2&menu=appellate&ID=30337 (last 
visited October 12, 2009).  Justice Dietzen has been a frequent lecturer on land 
use and real estate development.  See, e.g., Christopher J. Dietzen, et al., Land Use 
Law Update in Minnesota, 2001 NAT’L BUS. INST. 1; Christopher J. Dietzen, et al., 
Major Land Use Laws in Minnesota, 2001 NAT’L BUS. INST. 1; Christopher J. Dietzen, 
et al., Minnesota Land Use: Current Issues in Subdivision, Annexation and Zoning Law, 
2004 NAT’L BUS. INST. 1. 
 185. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 722 (Dietzen, J., concurring).   
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however, because he believed the majority was wrong not to reach 
the issue of whether the sixty-day rule applies to county subdivision 
applications.186
In fact, he was very critical of the majority for avoiding the 
issue.
 
187  He stated that “[t]he majority has articulated no legal or 
prudential reason to assess the County’s compliance with the sixty-
day rule without first deciding whether it applies, and I discern 
none.”188
He stated that a determination of whether the sixty-day rule 
applies to county subdivision applications first requires an analysis 
of applicable terms and phrases, such as “zoning,” “relating to,” 
and “subdivision.”
   
189  After analyzing those definitions, he 
concluded that a subdivision application is related to zoning,190 and 
therefore the type of application covered by the sixty-day rule.191
Next, he evaluated the three statutes excluded from section 
15.99.
   
192  Since the deadlines articulated in those three statutes 
either do not apply to subdivision applications submitted to a 
county, or do not provide new deadlines for such applications, the 
sixty-day deadline must apply.193  Justice Dietzen concluded that 
section 15.99 applies to subdivision applications and counties must 
comply with the sixty-day deadline.194
IV. ANALYSIS 
  
It appeared that the Calm Waters decision would finally clarify 
whether the sixty-day rule applied to county subdivision 
applications.195  Instead, the court disposed of the case without 
deciding the applicability of the rule.196
 
 186. Id. 
  While the court 
understandably avoided the issue because of contradicting 
 187. See id. at 723.  
 188. Id.  In addition, Justice Dietzen went on to say that “[a]bsent a sound 
reason for failing to decide the threshold issue presented in this case, the court 
should determine the applicability of the statute to the County.”  Id.  (emphasis 
added). 
 189. See id. at 723–24. 
 190. Id. at 724. 
 191. See id. 
 192. Id. at 724–25. 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. at 725. 
 195. See id. at 717 (stating that one of the issues before the court was whether 
the sixty-day rule applies to a subdivision application). 
 196. Id. at 718. 
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legislative intent197 and the difficulty of harmonizing these 
statutes,198
A. The Right Result 
 the court should have held that the sixty-day rule 
applied.  
Despite tackling only one of the issues presented, the court 
correctly reversed the court of appeals when it decided that the 
county met the sixty-day deadline. 
1. The County Met The Sixty-day Deadline  
Calm Waters’ had three central arguments: (1) the ordinance 
did not require a township approval letter; (2) the Environmental 
Services Director did not have the authority to extend the deadline; 
and (3) the planning commission did not have the authority to 
deny the application.199
The court correctly disposed of each argument.  First, the 
court properly recognized that the County had the authority to 
require the township approval letter in the spirit of cooperation 
with the platting ordinance, comprehensive plan, and past 
practices.
 
200  Second, a county is an agency within the meaning of 
section 15.99201 and Environmental Services is a department within 
Kanabec County.202  There is no reason to believe that the 
Environmental Services Director lacked authority to act on behalf 
of that department, and therefore the Director’s act of extending 
the deadline constituted an agency action authorized by section 
15.99, subdivision 3(f).203  Third, since a county planning 
commission can approve subdivision plans if granted such authority 
by the board of county commissioners,204
 
 197. See infra Part IV.B.2.  
 it would be irrational to 
believe that the planning commission would not have similar 
authority to deny such applications.  
 198. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 199. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 719. 
 200. Id. at 720; see also MINN. STAT. § 15.99, subdiv. 3(a) (2008) (stating that the 
required information can be established based on a “rule, ordinance, or policy of 
the agency”). 
 201. MINN. STAT. § 15.99, subdiv. 1(b) (2008). 
 202. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 721. 
 203. Id.  
 204. MINN. STAT. § 394.30, subdiv. 5 (2008). 
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2. Other Policy Considerations Lurking in the Waters? 
There are several additional policy issues raised in the case and 
associated news stories that support the court’s decision.  First, 
Calm Waters was trying to subdivide the land into approximately 
five-acre parcels.205  The Court stated that Calm Waters deliberately 
sought “to subvert the clear County policy of cooperation with local 
townships’ zoning regulations,”206 which required minimum lot 
sizes of twenty acres.207  Second, the court mentioned that “several 
members of the public spoke out against the proposed subdivision” 
at the September 20, 2006 meeting of the planning commission.208  
In addition, the local newspaper reported other allegations made 
by Calm Waters regarding a “back room deal” of an illegal lease of 
tax-forfeited land made by the County to a neighboring landowner 
that was designed to cut Calm Waters’ land off from a nearby state 
forest.209
The purpose of zoning laws in general is to promote 
compatibility between private owners and the public as a whole.
  
210  
Automatic approval of an application is usually not in the 
community’s best interest.211
B. The Court’s Failure to Reach the Threshold Issue 
  In this case, the court likely observed 
a developer seeking a loophole to subvert township policies, angry 
community members speaking out, and allegations of impropriety 
by government officials, and felt that automatic approval would not 
be in the community’s best interest. 
The majority declined to determine whether the sixty-day rule 
applied because the County had complied with it, and therefore 
the rule was irrelevant.212
 
 205. See Corn, supra note 8. 
  In general, judges make as much law “as 
is necessary to dispose of the case before them and give guidance 
 206. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 722. 
 207. See Corn, supra note 8. 
 208. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 718. 
 209. E-mail from Jay Corn, Editor, Kanabec County Times, to Kelly F. Hudick, 
Student, William Mitchell College of Law (Aug. 28, 2009, 10:10 CST) (on file with 
William Mitchell Law Review).  Presumably, if Calm Waters had been allowed to 
lease the tax-forfeited land instead, it would have increased the value of the 
existing parcel. 
 210. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 211. Poulin, supra note 3, at 621. 
 212. See Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 718. 
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for the future disposition of similar disputes.”213  Looking at the 
contradicting information available, it is plain to see why the court 
did not address the issue, preferring instead to dispose of the case 
without potentially making new law.214
1. Statutory Confusion 
   
In its amicus brief, the Minnesota County Attorneys 
Association argues that subdivision applications are not subject to 
section 15.99 because subdivision regulations are different from 
zoning regulations and therefore not related within the meaning of 
the statute.215  As articulated in the concurrence, however, the term 
“relating to” is very broad.216  Although subdivision and zoning are 
two separate things, they are at the very least “related” because 
both are forms of land-use regulations.217  Additional information 
from secondary authorities supports the notion that subdivisions 
are related to zoning.218  Although not identical in nature, or 
required to be used together, the two terms certainly have a logical 
relation to each other.219  These authorities mirror the conclusion 
reached by the concurrence.220
Both amicus briefs argue that the sixty-day rule should not 
apply to counties because the subdivision process is too “complex 




 213. WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 141 (3rd ed. 2003). 
  
Subdivision applications have their own regulations in chapter 505, 
 214. “[C]lumsy intrusion into an area may cause more harm than good; a 
court must recognize these possibilities and take care to ameliorate unfortunate 
side effects when it issues opinions.”  Id. at 149–50.  
 215. Brief for Minnesota County Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 10–11, Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2008) (Nos. 
A06-2019 & A06-2361) [hereinafter Brief for County Attorneys]. 
 216. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 723 (Dietzen, J., concurring). 
 217. See supra Part II.B. 
 218. Zoning is designed to separate uses of property, regulate population 
density, and prescribe lot sizes, proximity and the location of buildings that can be 
built on land.  5 ZIEGLER, JR. ET AL., supra note 26, § 89:4.  Subdivision regulations 
ensure that individual lots can be used for the purposes set forth in the zoning 
restrictions.  Id.  Zoning restrictions and subdivision requirements “are neither 
mutually exclusive nor does the exercise of one mandate the use of another.”  Id. 
 219. See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text. 
 220. See Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 723–24 (Dietzen, J., concurring). 
 221. Brief for County Attorneys, supra note 215, at 16; see also Brief for 
Association of Minnesota Counties as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6–
8, Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d 716 (Nos. A06–2019 & A06–2361) [hereinafter Brief 
for Minnesota Counties]. 
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but there is no separate automatic approval provision or deadline 
in that chapter and no language that affirmatively excludes it from 
the sixty-day deadline.222
Minnesota courts operate under the presumption that “the 
legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of 
execution, or unreasonable.” 
   
223  The 120-day preliminary approval 
deadline in section 462.358 applies only to municipalities,224 the 
120-day deadline in section 473.175 applies only to comprehensive 
plans,225 and chapter 505 applies to counties but does not set its 
own deadline.226  If the sixty-day rule in section 15.99 does not 
apply to county subdivision applications, then there effectively is no 
time limit for a county to approve or deny a subdivision 
application.  Considering that the statute’s purpose is to prevent 
government bodies from taking too long to approve applications, 
reverting to no timeline for county subdivision applicants is an 
absurd result in direct contrast with the original purpose.227
Furthermore, if the court held that the sixty-day deadline 
applies to county subdivision applications, but section 462.358—
with its 120-day deadline—applies to city subdivision applications, 
then two similar applications would be subject to two significantly 
different time lines.  The difficulty of harmonizing these statutes 
could be another reason the court avoided the issue. 
 
2. Legislative History 
The Calm Waters amicus briefs and prior appellate cases 
addressing the sixty-day rule rely on legislative history to determine 
whether lawmakers intended county subdivision applications to be 
excluded from the sixty-day rule.228
Section 15.99 was part of a public administration bill designed 
   
 
 222. See Brief for County Attorneys, supra note 215, at 10–12. 
 223. MINN. STAT. § 645.17 (2008). 
 224. MINN. STAT. § 462.351 (2008). 
 225. MINN. STAT. § 473.15 (2008). 
 226. MINN. STAT. § 505.03 (2008).  
 227. See Manco of Fairmont, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Rock Dell Twp., 583 N.W.2d 
293, 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that the purpose of the sixty-day rule is “to 
keep government agencies from taking too long in deciding issues like the one in 
question”). 
 228. See, e.g., Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 621 N.W.2d 37, 40–41 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2000); Brief for County Attorneys, supra note 215, at 11–12; Brief for 
Minnesota Counties, supra note 221, at 2–6. 
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to “improve efficiency and operation of government.”229  
Legislators enacted it in 1995 because they felt that “Minnesota 
citizens . . . have the right to receive a response to their requests in 
a timely manner and at the same time not be entangled in delays or 
squabbles.”230
The House Research notes state that the purpose of the 2003 
amendment was to exempt the “subdivision regulation review 
process and plat review process from the sixty-day rule.”
   
231  Amicus 
Curiae Association of Minnesota Counties relied on Senate 
Committee meeting notes from the 2003 amendment to section 
15.99, which reiterate that the purpose of the amendment was to 
exempt subdivision approvals in favor of the timelines in their 
respective statutes.232
While the legislative history behind section 15.99 is certainly 
interesting, relying on history is not permitted unless the statute is 
unclear.
 
233  Based on the conflicting goals in the legislative history, 
it is understandable why the supreme court wanted to avoid ruling 
on the issue.  However, for reasons articulated by Justice Dietzen in 
his concurring opinion, the statute is unambiguous, and therefore 
analysis of the legislative history is unnecessary.234
Finally, the legislature has amended the sixty-day rule five 
times since it was enacted.
 
235
C. Effect of the Supreme Court’s Non-Decision 
  If lawmakers truly intended that the 
sixty-day deadline not apply to county subdivision applications, it is 
well within their power to modify the law a sixth time to settle the 
debate once and for all. 
The supreme court expressly overruled the court of appeals’ 
holding that the County violated the sixty-day rule.236
 
 229. 1995 Minn. Laws 2415.   
  It did not, 
however, overrule the lower court’s decision that the rule applies to 
 230. House Floor Debate on H.F. No. 641 (April 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. 
Brown) (as cited in Am. Tower, 621 N.W.2d at 41).   
 231. See DYSON, supra note 92, at 1.   
 232. See Brief for Minnesota Counties, supra note 221, at 3–4.   
 233. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2008).  “When the words of the law are not explicit, 
the intention of the legislature may be ascertained by considering . . . the 
contemporaneous legislative history.”  Id. 
 234. Calm Waters, LLC v. Kanabec County Bd. of Comm’rs., 756 N.W.2d 716, 
723–24 (Minn. 2008) (Dietzen, J., concurring). 
 235. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 236. Calm Waters, 756 N.W.2d at 722. 
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county subdivision applications.237  Moreover, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has never expressly overruled Kramer, which held 
that the sixty-day rule applies to county subdivision applications.238
V. CONCLUSION 
  
For future litigants, this means that it is very likely that the sixty-day 
rule will be enforced for county subdivision applications.  It seems 
that the most prudent course of action for counties and the 
communities they serve is to operate under the assumption that the 
sixty-day rule applies. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly held that Kanabec 
County timely denied Calm Waters subdivision application.  But in 
assuming without deciding that the sixty-day rule applied to the 
facts of this case, the decision failed to guide Minnesota counties 
and future subdivision applicants and effectively leaves the door 
open to future litigation.  The concurrence’s explanation of why 
the sixty-day rule should apply was persuasive.  The majority should 
have adopted the concurrence’s position and confirmed the court 
of appeals ruling that section 15.99 applies to subdivision 
applications submitted to a county.   
In the aftermath, the court awarded attorneys’ fees to the 
County and denied a request for rehearing.239  No one has 
developed Calm Waters’ parcel of land in Kanabec County that was 
the subject of the controversy, and the land is currently listed for 
sale.240  The case has already been cited by the court of appeals as 
precedent for failing to reach an issue when resolution would be 
irrelevant.241
 
 237. Id. at 718. 
  What remains to be seen is if Justice Dietzen’s 
criticism of the majority for their failure to address a threshold 
issue without articulating a “sound reason” resurfaces in future 
 238. Kramer v. Otter Tail County Bd. of Comm’rs., 647 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2002). 
 239. Id. at 716.  The rehearing was denied on October 28, 2008.  Id. 
 240. As of September 23, 2009, the land located at 2788 Aleta Trl, Kroschel 
Twp, Minnesota, was listed at a price of $590,000.  According to the remarks, there 
is over one mile of linear frontage on three bodies of water, and the property 
adjoins “1000s of acres of public land.”  Realtor.com, Find Homes, 
http://www.realtor.com/realestateandhomes-search?mlslid=3681641 (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2009). 
 241. See In Re Disciplinary Action Against Anderson, 759 N.W.2d 892, 896 
(relying on Calm Waters as precedent for “declining to reach an issue where the 
resolution would be irrelevant”). 
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opinions.242
 
 242. See supra note 188. 
  So far, it appears that the Calm Waters case will be 
remembered more for the court’s non-decision than anything else. 
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